Interim Crediting Report by Smith, Joseph A.
Interim 
Crediting Report 
A Report from the Monitor of the National Mortgage Settlement
October 16, 2013
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This report to the public summarizes the official reports I have filed with the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia. It discusses consumer relief and refinancing assistance the servicers extended to distressed borrowers under the 
National Mortgage Settlement through December 31, 2012, including:
• A discussion of the servicers’ relief obligations under the Settlement.
• An overview of the process through which my colleagues and I reviewed the servicers’ relief activities.
• A report of my conclusions regarding the servicers’ performance of their relief obligations.
The credited relief discussed in this report indicates the servicers’ progress as of year-end 2012. Each servicer’s Internal Review 
Group provided me with information on the servicers’ crediting progress in February of this year. Since then, my team and I have 
thoroughly reviewed, tested and inquired about their activities, and I now make the conclusions found in this report.
As of December 31, 2012 each servicer had made substantial progress toward its required consumer relief and refinancing 
commitments. Bank of America, Citi, Chase, and Wells Fargo have subsequently asserted to me that they have completed 
their respective obligations. I have started my review process and will submit final crediting reports to the Court when and 
if I determine the credited relief meets the Settlement’s obligations. I hope and expect to report on each servicer’s final 
satisfaction of its obligations in the coming months.
Sincerely,
Joseph A. Smith, Jr.
Play video                                                                        
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Introduction
As required by the National Mortgage Settlement (NMS or Settlement),  
I have filed consumer relief reports with the United States District Court for 
the District of Columbia (the Court) for each servicer party to the NMS.1 These 
reports provide the results of my review of the servicers’ asserted consumer 
relief and refinancing activities (collectively, relief) through December 31, 
2012. Copies of these reports are available here. 
Structure of Relief under the Settlement
The servicers’ relief obligations are comprised of the following:
• Consumer relief – such as principal forgiveness and short sale assistance – for distressed borrowers who 
meet the Settlement’s eligibility criteria.
• Refinancing assistance for certain borrowers who are current on their payments but who would not qualify 
for traditional refinancing because their loan-to-value ratios are too high.
The servicers’ aggregate obligations are as follows:
Servicer Consumer Relief Obligations
Refinancing 
Options
Bank of America $7,626,200,000 $948,000,000
Chase $3,675,400,000 $537,000,000
Citi $1,411,000,000 $378,000,000
ResCap Parties $185,000,000 $15,000,000
Wells Fargo $3,434,000,000 $903,000,000
 1   I filed reports for Bank of America, Citibank, JP Morgan Chase and Wells Fargo on October 16, 2013. I previously filed a  
report on the ResCap Parties (ResCap) on February 12, 2013 that included a finding of partial satisfaction of ResCap’s 
relief obligations under the NMS. I certified to the Court and reported to the public that ResCap had satisfied its minimum 
consumer relief and refinancing credit requirements but had not yet completed its mandatory solicitation obligations 
under the NMS. I will review that work shortly.
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Credit for Consumer Relief
Consumer relief activities seek to address distressed borrowers’ needs in a variety of ways. The forms of consumer 
relief that have been extended by the servicers are, as follows:
• First Lien Mortgage Modifications
• Second Lien Portfolio Modifications
• Short Sales and Deeds-in-Lieu of Foreclosure
• Other Consumer Relief Programs2
The servicers have flexibility as to what types of relief to provide their borrowers within certain guidelines. The 
Settlement requires, with limited exceptions, that the amount of a servicer’s first lien mortgage modification credits 
equal at least 30 percent of a servicer’s total consumer relief credits and the amount of a servicer’s first and second 
lien mortgage modification credits equal at least 60 percent of a servicer’s total consumer relief credits. Additionally, 
at least 85 percent of the first lien mortgages on occupied properties for which the servicer claims credit for first 
lien mortgage modifications must have an unpaid principal balance before capitalization at or below the highest 
GSE conforming loan limit caps as of January 1, 2010. Maximums of 12.5 percent of a servicer’s credits can be from 
forbearance conversions, five percent from enhanced borrower transitional funds, 10 percent from deficiency waivers 
and 12 percent from anti-blight relief.
Credit for Refinancing Programs
Credit for refinancing is available for first lien mortgages the servicer owns where the loan-to-value ratio is greater than 
80 percent and the borrower would not have qualified for a refinance under the servicer’s generally available refinance 
programs as of September 30, 2011. Credit for refinancing is based on the reduction in the monthly interest rate multiplied 
by the unpaid principal balance of the loan times a multiplier reflecting the term of the interest rate reduction.3
Bonuses and Penalties
The Settlement provides servicers bonus credit of 25 percent for any first or second lien principal reduction and amounts 
credited for refinancing before February 28, 2013. It also provides penalties between 125 percent and 140 percent of the 
unmet obligation if relief is not completed by the established deadlines.
2   The other Consumer Relief Programs can include enhanced borrower transitional funds paid by servicer, servicer 
payments to unrelated second lienholder for release of second lien, forbearance for unemployed borrowers, deficiency 
waivers, forgiveness of principal associated with a property in connection with a decision not to pursue foreclosure, cash 
costs paid by servicer for demolition of property, and real-estate owned (“REO”) properties donated.
3  If the new rate applies for the life of the loan, the multiplier is eight for loans with a remaining term greater than 15 years, 
six for loans with a remaining term between 10 and 15 years, and five for loans with a remaining term less than 10 years. If 
the new rate applies for five years, the multiplier is five.
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Non-Creditable Requirements
The NMS also imposes several non-creditable consumer relief requirements on the servicers, including the  
following obligations:
• not to implement any consumer relief “through policies that are intended to (i) disfavor a specific geography 
within or among the states that are a party [to the consent judgment] or (ii) discriminate against any 
protected class of borrowers;” 
• not to require borrowers to waive or release claims and defenses as a condition of approval for loss mitigation;
• to modify second lien mortgages when a servicer party to the Settlement modifies a first lien mortgage;
• to extinguish certain second liens;
• to reduce credits by the amount of state or federal incentive payments when they are the source of the 
claimed credit;
• to implement a refinancing program for all borrowers who meet specified minimum eligibility criteria and use 
reasonable efforts to identify active service members who qualify for refinancing and to solicit them; and
• to waive any deficiency amount remaining after certain short sales when the seller is an eligible service member.
Assertion and Testing of Consumer Relief 
Consumer relief crediting is based on the actions of three distinct entities:
• The servicer, which performs the consumer relief activities and reports quarterly.
• The Internal Review Group (IRG), a group of employees or contractors of the servicer that is independent of 
the servicer’s mortgage loan servicing operations. This group confirms the eligibility of the servicer’s consumer 
relief activities, the amount of credited relief, and reports to me at the end of each calendar year (and more 
frequently under certain circumstances) and when the servicer asserts that it has satisfied its relief obligations.
• The Monitor (my role), who, working with and through my primary professional firm (PPF) BDO Consulting, 
reviews the satisfaction reports and conducts other procedures as necessary to determine whether the reports 
are correct and complete. In this role, I ultimately determine whether and when a servicer has satisfied its 
obligations. The NMS requires me to file reports with the Court detailing my conclusions on the servicer’s 
performance.
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Each IRG, my colleagues and I use methods outlined in a work plan to determine 
that all or a portion of the servicer’s obligations have been performed or satisfied. 
These work plans were negotiated by the servicers and me, and reviewed by the 
Monitoring Committee, pursuant to the NMS.
In early 2013, the servicers reported to their respective IRGs their consumer relief 
performance through December 31, 2012. The IRGs then reviewed the servicers’ 
reports and asserted to me the servicers’ progress toward their obligations in 
mid-February. My PPF then devoted more than 12,000 hours in total reviewing 
the IRGs’ satisfaction reports and retesting their testing samples to determine 
compliance.
To determine whether there were any material inaccuracies in the servicers’ 
State Reports, my PPF compared the State Reports’ relief information with the 
information the servicers reported to their IRGs, identified any apparent differences, 
and inquired with the servicers and IRGs to understand those differences.
In addition to testing the servicers’ performance in meeting their relief 
obligations, my PPF and I interviewed senior officers from each of the servicers 
to determine that their servicer complied with the non-creditable requirements 
of the NMS.
Monitor’s Role: Crediting Process
The Monitor and his team work closely with 
the banks to verify their credit for consumer relief 
activities under the settlement.
Step Seven: 
Monitor submits  
his reports to the D.C. 
District Court
If errors are found,
Monitor/PPF discuss 
with IRG and bank. Bank 
remediates, where 
appropriate.
Step Four: 
IRG asserts 
bank’s crediting 
to the Monitor
Step Six: 
Monitor 
creates report 
on testing 
results
The IRG teams, made up of 116 
professionals, test randomly 
selected samples of the banks’ 
loans submitted for credit. The 
samples are determined on a 99% 
confidence level. 
The Monitor’s review includes 
in-depth re-testing.
50 professionals spent 
approximately 12,000 hours on 
re-testing the IRGs’ work over an 
eight-month period.
The Monitor and his PPF meets with 
the banks for in-depth overviews of 
their operations and processes. 
IRGs test each borrower’s loan to 
ensure:
· The loan was eligible
· The borrower received relief
· The bank accurately calculated the  
 amount of credit 
After testing, IRGs compare their 
tested credits against the amount 
of credit claimed by the banks. If the 
bank over-reported credit by 2% in a 
testing population, the bank must 
analyze and correct all loans in the 
population.
Step Three: 
IRG tests
Step Five: 
Monitor and his 
Primary Professional 
Firm (PPF) tests
IRG identifies error and 
bank remediates.
Step One: 
Banks provide consumer 
relief to borrowers
Step Two: 
 Each bank 
submits 
Consumer Relief 
Reports to its 
Internal Review 
Group (IRG)
The banks and the Monitor worked 
together to develop plans to test the 
implementation of their consumer 
relief requirements.
Click to enlarge                               
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Determination of Performance
Based on the procedures outlined above, I have determined that through December 31, 2012, the servicers  
have made the following progress toward satisfaction of their obligations:
Servicer
Number of 
Loans
Total Credited 
Consumer Relief
Total Consumer 
Relief Obligations 4
% Completed
Consumer Relief
Total Gross 
Dollar Consumer Relief
Bank of America 287,906 $7,401,570,384 $7,626,200,000 97% $25,019,888,318
Chase 73,748 $2,784,330,737 $3,675,400,000 76% $7,284,906,959
Citi 14,227 $655,103,037 $1,411,000,000 46% $1,002,245,403
Wells Fargo 45,469 $1,890,708,213 $3,434,000,000 55% $3,319,024,181
SUbTOTAl 421,350 $12,731,712,371 $16,146,600,000 — $36,626,064,861
Servicer
Number of 
Loans
Total Credited 
Refinancing
Total Refinancing 
Obligation
% Completed 
Refinancing 5 Total Refinancing 6
Bank of America 7,514 $392,232,910 $948,000,000 41% $321,039,294
Chase 12,342 $606,127,639 $537,000,000 113% $478,574,160
Citi 13,407 $519,098,690 $378,000,000 137% $404,795,612
Wells Fargo 22,143 $1,105,510,531 $903,000,000 122% $889,877,903
SUbTOTAl 55,406 $2,622,969,770 $2,766,000,000 — $2,094,286,969
ToTAl CoNSUMER 
RElIEF AND  
REFINANCING 476,756 $15,354,682,141 $18,912,600,000 — $38,720,351,830
I have certified credited relief in aggregate of $15.35 billion, which is less than $38.72 billion, the amount of total 
gross dollar consumer relief for the same period. The amount of credit the servicers earn toward their obligations 
differs depending on the type of relief activity performed. For instance, certain types of first lien loan modifications 
earn $1 of credit for $1 of relief. Other activity earns pennies on the dollar. A deficiency waiver on a first or second 
lien loan, for example, earns a $0.10 credit for each dollar waived.
The gross dollar relief summarized above is slightly different than the gross dollar relief the servicers previously 
reported for the same period in their State Reports, which I summarized in a series of progress reports.7 My PPF 
and I have not identified any material inaccuracies in these State Reports. Differences in the amount of relief 
from the State Reports occurred when I determined that certain loans were not eligible for credit or the servicers 
decided not to seek credit for particular loans. 
I also have no reason to believe that any of the servicers failed to comply with the non-creditable consumer  
relief requirements.
4   In this chart, Total Consumer Relief Obligations, Total Credited Consumer Relief and Percent Completed Total  
Consumer Relief exclude relief amounts as a result of excess refinancing. 
5  The NMS authorizes the servicers to apply some amount of its excess refinancings to its first and second lien principal 
reduction obligations. See Exhibit D¶ 9.f. and Exhibit D-1, Table 1.
6  Total Refinancing represents the sum of the estimated total benefit to the borrower from all credited refinancing activity.  
We determined the estimated benefit to the borrower from each refinanced loan by calculating the product of the  
reduction in the loan’s interest rate times the unpaid principal balance and then multiplying that product by 7.85, 
which represents the servicers’ weighted multiplier under the Settlement per Exhibit D ¶ 9.e.ii.1. and is consistent with 
what some of the servicers are reporting in their filings with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.
7  See First Take, Continued Progress, Ongoing Implementation, Updated Consumer Relief, and Final Progress Report.
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bank of America, N.A.
On October 16, 2013, I filed my report with the Court on Bank of 
America’s consumer relief activities through December 31, 2012.  
Bank of America’s report is available here.
Throughout our testing process, my PPF interacted extensively 
with the Bank of America IRG to resolve issues requiring additional 
clarification and evidence.
After receiving this information and completing testing, I determined 
that the IRG correctly validated the credited relief amounts reported 
by Bank of America.
In my report to the Court, I confirmed that through year-end  
2012, Bank of America completed approximately $7.79 billion in 
credited relief, complied with the non-creditable requirements, 
and accurately reported gross relief in its State Reports.
Bank of America Credited Relief
Total Credited Consumer Relief  — $7,793,803,294 
First Lien Principal Forgiveness 
$2,038,797,290 
First Lien Forbearance Forgiveness
$131,320,556 
Second Lien Extinguishment Forgiveness
$2,210,934,257 
Refinance
$392,232,910 
Short Sales/Deeds-in-Lieu 
$2,952,168,609 
Enhanced Borrower Transitional Funds 
$68,349,672 
Click to enlarge                               
SCORECARD: 
Bank ofAmerica Consumer Relief Crediting
* This discrepancy, when combined with any other error in the testing 
 population sample, was within the permitted 2% margin of error. 
The Bank of America Internal Review Group (IRG) tested 1,301 
of the bank’s 259,420 loans for which it claimed credit. The Monitor 
and his Primary Professional Firm (PPF) then tested the 1,301 
loans that the IRG had reviewed. Below are errors that the IRG or 
Monitor identified. 
ERROR
NUMBER OF LOANS 
IN QUESTION RESOLUTION/REMEDIATION
1.   Bank of America inaccurately  
 claimed credit for first lien   
 modification loans when the  
 completion date was after the  
 report date of December 31, 2012.
IRG identified the errors.
This error caused an over-reporting of credit by $212,994.*2
2. Bank of America claimed credit for  
 second lien extinguishments using  
 an inaccurate days past due  
 calculation.
IRG identified the errors. 
This error caused an over-reporting of credit by $240,960.*7
3. Bank of America claimed credit  
 using an incorrect extinguishment  
 amount for second liens.  
The Monitor and his PPF identified the error.
This error caused an over-reporting of credit by $15,294.*1
4. Bank of America incorrectly claimed   
 credit for second lien extinguishments   
 for loans that had been previously   
 deemed charge-offs.
IRG identified the error. 
This error caused an over-reporting of credit by $12,066.*1
5. Bank of America incorrectly claimed   
 credit for second lien extinguishments  
 where the lien had been released prior  
 to the borrower debt being    
 extinguished.
The Monitor and his team identified the error. 
This error caused an over-reporting of credit by $5,109.*1
6. Bank of America incorrectly claimed  
 credit for short sales when the lien  
 was released prior to the sale date.
The Monitor and his team identified the errors.
This error caused an over-reporting of credit by $77,495.*3
7. Bank of America incorrectly claimed  
 credit for a short sale when the  
 completion was prior to March 1,  
 2012.
IRG identified one error and the Monitor and his team identified 
the second error. 
This error caused an over-reporting of credit by $22,886.*
2
8. Bank of America used an incorrect  
 calculation to determine credit for  
 short sales.
IRG identified the errors.
This error caused an over-reporting of credit by $5,700.*3
Through December 31, 2012
Click to enlarge                               
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CitiMortgage, Inc.
I filed my report with the Court on Citi’s consumer relief activities 
through December 31, 2012 on October 16, 2013. Citi’s report can be 
found here. 
During testing, my PPF identified several issues and worked with the 
IRG and Citi to resolve or remediate the errors. 
Following remediation of these issues, I determined that the IRG had 
correctly validated the credited relief amount reported by Citi.
In my report to the Court, I confirmed that Citi completed 
approximately $1.17 billion in credited relief, complied with  
the non-creditable requirements, and had no material  
inaccuracies in its State Reports through year-end 2012.
Citi Credited Relief 
Total Credited Consumer Relief  — $1,174,201,727  
First Lien Principal Forgiveness
$238,728,735 
First Lien Forbearance Forgiveness
$176,374,951 
Refinance
$ 519,098,690 
Short Sales/Deeds-in-Lieu 
$237,905,577 
Enhanced Borrower Transitional Funds 
$ 751,819  
Payment to Unrelated Second Lien Holder 
$1,341,955 
Click to enlarge                               
SCORECARD: 
Citi Consumer Relief Crediting
ERROR
NUMBER OF LOANS 
IN QUESTION RESOLUTION/REMEDIATION
1.    Citi determined credit for second  
 lien government modifications 
 based on an incorrect number of 
 days past due.
The Monitor and his PPF identified the errors.
Citi withdrew its assertion on second lien loans for the 
period of March 1, 2012 through Dec. 31, 2012 and did not 
claim credit for second liens for this period. Citi will correct 
the error in the population for the period March 1, 2012 
through June 30, 2013, and will submit an assertion on 
second lien loans for that period for its final crediting. 
2
2. Citi claimed credit for a short 
 sale when there was no evidence  
 that the deficiency was waived 
 or the borrower was released 
 from liability. 
IRG identified the error.
The borrower’s file did not contain a letter from the 
bank informing them that the deficiency was waived.*
1
3. Citi miscalculated credits for 
 first lien short sales. 
IRG identified this error in 26 loans and the PPF 
subsequently identified the error in an additional loan. 
70% of the miscalculations were understatements of 
credit and 30% were overstatements of credit.* 
27
4. Citi miscalculated credits for second 
 lien short sales.  
IRG identified the errors.
All of the miscalculations were understatements of credit.*21
The Citi Internal Review Group (IRG) tested 1,275 of the bank’s 47,854 
loans for which it claimed credit. The Monitor and his Primary Professional 
Firm (PPF) then re-tested the 1,275 loans the IRG had reviewed. Below are 
the errors that the IRG or Monitor identified. Through December 31, 2012
* This discrepancy, when combined with any other error in the testing 
 population sample, was within the permitted 2% margin of error. 
Click to enlarge                               
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J.P. Morgan Chase bank, N.A.
My report on Chase’s consumer relief activities through December 31, 
2012 was submitted to the Court on October 16, 2013. Chase’s report is 
available here. 
During testing, my PPF identified several issues and worked  
with the IRG and Chase to resolve or remediate the errors.
Following remediation, I confirmed that the credit provided  
was accurate.
In my report to the Court, I confirmed that Chase completed 
approximately $3.39 billion in credited consumer relief activities and 
complied with the non-creditable requirements through year-end 
2012. I also found that there were no material inaccuracies in Chase’s 
State Reports’ reported gross dollar relief.
Chase  Credited Relief
Total Credited Consumer Relief  — $3,390,458,376  
First Lien Principal Forgiveness
$891,923,942 
First Lien Forbearance Forgiveness
$211,630,443 
Second Lien Modification Forgiveness
$846,360 
Refinance
$606,127,639 
Short Sales/Deeds-in-Lieu 
$1,495,692,789 
Enhanced Borrower Transitional Funds 
$136,957,159 
Payment to Unrela
$9,780,918 
Anti-Blight 
$37,499,126 
ted Second Lien Holder 
Click to enlarge                               
SCORECARD: 
Chase Consumer Relief Crediting
ERROR
NUMBER OF LOANS 
IN QUESTION RESOLUTION/REMEDIATION
1.    Chase claimed more credit for  
           second lien government 
 modification loans than was accurate.
During testing, the Monitor and his PPF identified a credit  
calculation error that exceeded the 2% margin of error. 
The Monitor informed Chase of the errors.
Chase removed the entire population of second lien government 
modification loans from its Consumer Relief Report, totaling 478 
loans and approximately $5.7 million in credit.
29
2. Chase and its IRG incorrectly  
 calculated days past due on its 
 first lien loans, affecting the  
 eligibility of certain loans to 
 receive credit.
While reviewing the IRG’s testing procedures, the Monitor 
and his team identified the error and notified Chase, which 
decided to withdraw its entire 1st lien population.
Chase recalculated days past due for its entire first lien 
population and submitted a new first lien Consumer Relief 
Report. The IRG then selected a new sample to test.
1st
3. Chase incorrectly claimed credit for  
 making payments toward second  
 liens that it owned in connection  
 with short sales. Credit is only given  
 when the payment is to a different  
 second lien holder.  
The Monitor and his team identified the errors and found 
that Chase over-reported $25,000 in credit.*4
4. Chase claimed credit for a first lien   
 conditional forgiveness modification that 
 was not eligible for credit because the 
 borrower was neither 30 days past due nor 
 at risk of being in imminent default.  
IRG identified the error and found that Chase over-reported 
$65,211 in credit.*1
The Chase Internal Review Group (IRG) tested 3,040 of the bank’s 
86,569 loans for which it sought credit. The Monitor and his Primary 
Professional Firm (PPF) then re-tested a substantial subsample of 
the loans the IRG had tested. Below are the errors the IRG or the 
Monitor identified and remediated.
5. Chase claimed credit for a refinance  
 loan that was not eligible for credit  
 because it had a pre-modification  
 loan-to-value ratio below 80%.
IRG identified the error and found that Chase over-reported 
$73,927 in credit.*1
6. Chase claimed credit for a refinance  
 loan that was not eligible for credit  
 because it was not fully amortizing  
 and had a balloon payment due at  
 the end of its term. 
The Monitor and his team identified the error and found 
that Chase over-reported $61,431 in credit.*1
Through December 31, 2012
Retested entire
 
lien population
* This discrepancy, when combined with any other error in the testing 
 population sample, was within the permitted 2% margin of error. 
Click to enlarge                               
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Wells Fargo & Company
I filed my report with the Court on Wells Fargo’s consumer relief 
activities through December 31, 2012 on October 16, 2013. Wells 
Fargo’s report is available here. 
As my PPF conducted its testing, it worked closely with the IRG and 
Wells Fargo to resolve issues as necessary. 
After resolving these issues, I certified that the IRG accurately 
validated credit amounts for Wells Fargo. 
In my report to the Court, I confirmed that Wells Fargo completed 
approximately $3 billion in credited relief, complied with the  
non-creditable requirements, and accurately reported gross relief in  
its State Reports through year-end 2012.
Wells Fargo Credited Relief
Total Credited Consumer Relief  — $2,996,218,744
First Lien Principal Forgiveness
$948,393,086 
First Lien Forbearance Forgiveness
$163,030,234 
Second Lien Extinguishment Forgiveness
$35,598,590 
Refinance
$1,105,510,531 
Short Sales/Deeds-in-Lieu 
$724,861,417 
Enhanced Borrower Transitional Funds 
$8,396,631 
Payment to Unrelated Second Lien Holder 
$5,484,794 
Anti-Blight 
$4,943,461 
Click to enlarge                               
SCORECARD: 
Wells Consumer Relief Crediting
ERROR
NUMBER OF LOANS 
IN QUESTION RESOLUTION/REMEDIATION
The Wells Internal Review Group (IRG) tested 1,276 of the bank’s 
67,612 loans for which it claimed credit. The Monitor and his 
Primary Professional Firm (PPF) then tested the 1,276 loans the 
IRG had reviewed. Below are the errors that the IRG or Monitor identified.
1.    Wells claimed credit for a first lien modification   
        loan using an incorrect valuation.
IRG identified the error.
This error caused an over-reporting of credit by $95,313.*1
2. Wells claimed credit for a first lien modification   
 loan that was not reduced to the minimum   
 Debt-to-Income (DTI) ratio of 31%. 
IRG identified that Wells’ submission showed a post-mod DTI of 
0%. Upon review, the borrower’s post-modification DTI was 35.7%. 
This error caused an over-reporting of credit by $102,807.*
1
3. Wells claimed credit for first lien   
 government modification loans using an  
 incorrect incentive amount. 
IRG identified the errors. 
For three of these loans, Wells used a larger incentive amount, 
which created an under reporting of credit by $179,995. For the 
remaining three loans, Wells used a smaller incentive amount, 
which created an over-reporting of credit by $20,837.*
6
4. IRG approved credit for first lien government   
 modification loans using an improper unpaid 
 principal balance to calculate the pre-modification  
 loan-to-value ratio. 
The Monitor and his PPF identified the errors. 
This error created an under-reporting of $3,515.*34
5. Wells over-reported credit for a first lien  
 government modification loan due to using an  
 incorrect credit calculation.  
IRG identified the error.
This error created an over-reporting of credit by $10,280.*1
6. Wells over-reported credit for a first lien   
 deed-in-lieu loan due to using an incorrect   
 valuation. 
IRG identified the error.
This error created an over-reporting of credit by $63,123.*1
7. Wells over-reported credit for first lien short  
 sale loans under the Home Affordable   
 Foreclosure Alternatives (HAFA) program by  
 including the HAFA incentive in its credit  
 calculation instead of netting it out. 
IRG identified the errors.
This error created an over-reporting of credit by $2,791.*2
8. Wells claimed credit for first lien short sale  
 loans when the loans were second lien short 
 sale loans. 
IRG identified the errors.
This error created an over-reporting of credit by $64,679.*2
9. Wells over-reported credit for a second lien 
 short sale loan due to a calculation error. 
IRG identified the error.
This error created an over-reporting of credit by $12,164.*1
10.   Wells claimed credit for second lien 
   extinguishments when the first lien no 
   longer existed. 
IRG identified one of the errors and the Monitor and his team 
identified the other error.
This error created an over-reporting of credit by $11,154.*
2
Through December 31, 2012
* This discrepancy, when combined with any other error in the testing 
 population sample, was within the permitted 2% margin of error. 
Click to enlarge                               
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Conclusion
The crediting reports I have just filed with the Court reflect the progress the servicers have made in providing relief 
to homeowners through year-end 2012, and the thorough review process conducted to validate these activities. The 
three progress reports I have released this year show that relief activities have continued in 2013. As I mentioned 
earlier, Bank of America, Citi, Chase, and Wells Fargo have asserted to me that they have now completed their 
obligations. Once I complete my reviews and determine the accuracy of the remainder of the servicers’ consumer 
relief activities, I will submit final crediting reports to the Court.
Monitor’s Role: Crediting Process
The Monitor and his team work closely with 
the banks to verify their credit for consumer relief 
activities under the settlement.
Step Seven: 
Monitor submits  
his reports to the D.C. 
District Court
If errors are found,
Monitor/PPF discuss 
with IRG and bank. Bank 
remediates, where 
appropriate.
Step Four: 
IRG asserts 
bank’s crediting 
to the Monitor
Step Six: 
Monitor 
creates report 
on testing 
results
The IRG teams, made up of 116 
professionals, test randomly 
selected samples of the banks’ 
loans submitted for credit. The 
samples are determined on a 99% 
confidence level. 
The Monitor’s review includes 
in-depth re-testing.
50 professionals spent 
approximately 12,000 hours on 
re-testing the IRGs’ work over an 
eight-month period.
The Monitor and his PPF meets with 
the banks for in-depth overviews of 
their operations and processes. 
IRGs test each borrower’s loan to 
ensure:
· The loan was eligible
· The borrower received relief
· The bank accurately calculated the  
 amount of credit 
After testing, IRGs compare their 
tested credits against the amount 
of credit claimed by the banks. If the 
bank over-reported credit by 2% in a 
testing population, the bank must 
analyze and correct all loans in the 
population.
Step Three: 
IRG tests
Step Five: 
Monitor and his 
Primary Professional 
Firm (PPF) tests
IRG identifies error and 
bank remediates.
Step One: 
Banks provide consumer 
relief to borrowers
Step Two: 
 Each bank 
submits 
Consumer Relief 
Reports to its 
Internal Review 
Group (IRG)
The banks and the Monitor worked 
together to develop plans to test the 
implementation of their consumer 
relief requirements.
SCORECARD: 
Bank ofAmerica Consumer Relief Crediting
* This discrepancy, when combined with any other error in the testing 
 population sample, was within the permitted 2% margin of error. 
The Bank of America Internal Review Group (IRG) tested 1,301 
of the bank’s 259,420 loans for which it claimed credit. The Monitor 
and his Primary Professional Firm (PPF) then tested the 1,301 
loans that the IRG had reviewed. Below are errors that the IRG or 
Monitor identified. 
ERROR
NUMBER OF LOANS 
IN QUESTION RESOLUTION/REMEDIATION
1.   Bank of America inaccurately  
 claimed credit for first lien   
 modification loans when the  
 completion date was after the  
 report date of December 31, 2012.
IRG identified the errors.
This error caused an over-reporting of credit by $212,994.*2
2. Bank of America claimed credit for  
 second lien extinguishments using  
 an inaccurate days past due  
 calculation.
IRG identified the errors. 
This error caused an over-reporting of credit by $240,960.*7
3. Bank of America claimed credit  
 using an incorrect extinguishment  
 amount for second liens.  
The Monitor and his PPF identified the error.
This error caused an over-reporting of credit by $15,294.*1
4. Bank of America incorrectly claimed   
 credit for second lien extinguishments   
 for loans that had been previously   
 deemed charge-offs.
IRG identified the error. 
This error caused an over-reporting of credit by $12,066.*1
5. Bank of America incorrectly claimed   
 credit for second lien extinguishments  
 where the lien had been released prior  
 to the borrower debt being    
 extinguished.
The Monitor and his team identified the error. 
This error caused an over-reporting of credit by $5,109.*1
6. Bank of America incorrectly claimed  
 credit for short sales when the lien  
 was released prior to the sale date.
The Monitor and his team identified the errors.
This error caused an over-reporting of credit by $77,495.*3
7. Bank of America incorrectly claimed  
 credit for a short sale when the  
 completion was prior to March 1,  
 2012.
IRG identified one error and the Monitor and his team identified 
the second error. 
This error caused an over-reporting of credit by $22,886.*
2
8. Bank of America used an incorrect  
 calculation to determine credit for  
 short sales.
IRG identified the errors.
This error caused an over-reporting of credit by $5,700.*3
Through December 31, 2012
SCORECARD: 
Chase Consumer Relief Crediting
ERROR
NUMBER OF LOANS 
IN QUESTION RESOLUTION/REMEDIATION
1.    Chase claimed more credit for  
           second lien government 
 modification loans than was accurate.
During testing, the Monitor and his PPF identified a credit  
calculation error that exceeded the 2% margin of error. 
The Monitor informed Chase of the errors.
Chase removed the entire population of second lien government 
modification loans from its Consumer Relief Report, totaling 478 
loans and approximately $5.7 million in credit.
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2. Chase and its IRG incorrectly  
 calculated days past due on its 
 first lien loans, affecting the  
 eligibility of certain loans to 
 receive credit.
While reviewing the IRG’s testing procedures, the Monitor 
and his team identified the error and notified Chase, which 
decided to withdraw its entire 1st lien population.
Chase recalculated days past due for its entire first lien 
population and submitted a new first lien Consumer Relief 
Report. The IRG then selected a new sample to test.
1st
3. Chase incorrectly claimed credit for  
 making payments toward second  
 liens that it owned in connection  
 with short sales. Credit is only given  
 when the payment is to a different  
 second lien holder.  
The Monitor and his team identified the errors and found 
that Chase over-reported $25,000 in credit.*4
4. Chase claimed credit for a first lien   
 conditional forgiveness modification that 
 was not eligible for credit because the 
 borrower was neither 30 days past due nor 
 at risk of being in imminent default.  
IRG identified the error and found that Chase over-reported 
$65,211 in credit.*1
The Chase Internal Review Group (IRG) tested 3,040 of the bank’s 
86,569 loans for which it sought credit. The Monitor and his Primary 
Professional Firm (PPF) then re-tested a substantial subsample of 
the loans the IRG had tested. Below are the errors the IRG or the 
Monitor identified and remediated.
5. Chase claimed credit for a refinance  
 loan that was not eligible for credit  
 because it had a pre-modification  
 loan-to-value ratio below 80%.
IRG identified the error and found that Chase over-reported 
$73,927 in credit.*1
6. Chase claimed credit for a refinance  
 loan that was not eligible for credit  
 because it was not fully amortizing  
 and had a balloon payment due at  
 the end of its term. 
The Monitor and his team identified the error and found 
that Chase over-reported $61,431 in credit.*1
Through December 31, 2012
Retested entire
 
lien population
* This discrepancy, when combined with any other error in the testing 
 population sample, was within the permitted 2% margin of error. 
SCORECARD: 
Citi Consumer Relief Crediting
ERROR
NUMBER OF LOANS 
IN QUESTION RESOLUTION/REMEDIATION
1.    Citi determined credit for second  
 lien government modifications 
 based on an incorrect number of 
 days past due.
The Monitor and his PPF identified the errors.
Citi withdrew its assertion on second lien loans for the 
period of March 1, 2012 through Dec. 31, 2012 and did not 
claim credit for second liens for this period. Citi will correct 
the error in the population for the period March 1, 2012 
through June 30, 2013, and will submit an assertion on 
second lien loans for that period for its final crediting. 
2
2. Citi claimed credit for a short 
 sale when there was no evidence  
 that the deficiency was waived 
 or the borrower was released 
 from liability. 
IRG identified the error.
The borrower’s file did not contain a letter from the 
bank informing them that the deficiency was waived.*
1
3. Citi miscalculated credits for 
 first lien short sales. 
IRG identified this error in 26 loans and the PPF 
subsequently identified the error in an additional loan. 
70% of the miscalculations were understatements of 
credit and 30% were overstatements of credit.* 
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4. Citi miscalculated credits for second 
 lien short sales.  
IRG identified the errors.
All of the miscalculations were understatements of credit.*21
The Citi Internal Review Group (IRG) tested 1,275 of the bank’s 47,854 
loans for which it claimed credit. The Monitor and his Primary Professional 
Firm (PPF) then re-tested the 1,275 loans the IRG had reviewed. Below are 
the errors that the IRG or Monitor identified. Through December 31, 2012
* This discrepancy, when combined with any other error in the testing 
 population sample, was within the permitted 2% margin of error. 
SCORECARD: 
Wells Consumer Relief Crediting
ERROR
NUMBER OF LOANS 
IN QUESTION RESOLUTION/REMEDIATION
The Wells Internal Review Group (IRG) tested 1,276 of the bank’s 
67,612 loans for which it claimed credit. The Monitor and his 
Primary Professional Firm (PPF) then tested the 1,276 loans the 
IRG had reviewed. Below are the errors that the IRG or Monitor identified.
1.    Wells claimed credit for a first lien modification   
        loan using an incorrect valuation.
IRG identified the error.
This error caused an over-reporting of credit by $95,313.*1
2. Wells claimed credit for a first lien modification   
 loan that was not reduced to the minimum   
 Debt-to-Income (DTI) ratio of 31%. 
IRG identified that Wells’ submission showed a post-mod DTI of 
0%. Upon review, the borrower’s post-modification DTI was 35.7%. 
This error caused an over-reporting of credit by $102,807.*
1
3. Wells claimed credit for first lien   
 government modification loans using an  
 incorrect incentive amount. 
IRG identified the errors. 
For three of these loans, Wells used a larger incentive amount, 
which created an under reporting of credit by $179,995. For the 
remaining three loans, Wells used a smaller incentive amount, 
which created an over-reporting of credit by $20,837.*
6
4. IRG approved credit for first lien government   
 modification loans using an improper unpaid 
 principal balance to calculate the pre-modification  
 loan-to-value ratio. 
The Monitor and his PPF identified the errors. 
This error created an under-reporting of $3,515.*34
5. Wells over-reported credit for a first lien  
 government modification loan due to using an  
 incorrect credit calculation.  
IRG identified the error.
This error created an over-reporting of credit by $10,280.*1
6. Wells over-reported credit for a first lien   
 deed-in-lieu loan due to using an incorrect   
 valuation. 
IRG identified the error.
This error created an over-reporting of credit by $63,123.*1
7. Wells over-reported credit for first lien short  
 sale loans under the Home Affordable   
 Foreclosure Alternatives (HAFA) program by  
 including the HAFA incentive in its credit  
 calculation instead of netting it out. 
IRG identified the errors.
This error created an over-reporting of credit by $2,791.*2
8. Wells claimed credit for first lien short sale  
 loans when the loans were second lien short 
 sale loans. 
IRG identified the errors.
This error created an over-reporting of credit by $64,679.*2
9. Wells over-reported credit for a second lien 
 short sale loan due to a calculation error. 
IRG identified the error.
This error created an over-reporting of credit by $12,164.*1
10.   Wells claimed credit for second lien 
   extinguishments when the first lien no 
   longer existed. 
IRG identified one of the errors and the Monitor and his team 
identified the other error.
This error created an over-reporting of credit by $11,154.*
2
Through December 31, 2012
* This discrepancy, when combined with any other error in the testing 
 population sample, was within the permitted 2% margin of error. 
